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DAVID V. SNYDER: Bonjour. Good morning. I would like to 
start us thinking about the problems and prospects of comparative 
law.  
At this point in the conference, at the end, it seems to me we 
should focus on two topics. First, we need to identify and consider 
the most challenging problems in comparative law. To articulate the 
issues often leads a long way toward a solution. Second, we should 
look to the future of the discipline, perhaps (but not necessarily) in 
light of those problems.  
Over the years, and particularly in the last decade, comparative 
law has been criticized for excessive doctrinalism, shuttered attitudes 
to interdisciplinary inquiry, timidity in approaching broad-gauge 
study, as well as tendencies to superficiality, triviality, obscurantism, 
and exoticization—not to mention claims of ultimate irrelevance.  
These sorts of problems have paralyzed me sometimes. It will not 
come as a surprise to you that I have written a certain amount in 
comparative law.7 But it may come as a surprise to you that I have 
never taught and have no plans to teach comparative law. I do not 
know how to do it. 
I should perhaps say I have taught no course that has “comparative 
law” in the title. I do teach international sales, and in that course I 
cannot help but be a comparatist. From the standpoint of 
transactional lawyers, there are many legal choices to be made in 
engineering a transaction and in choosing the legal regime that will 
govern it. To be more concrete: an international sale will require 
some source of law. The sale might be governed by international 
law,8 or it might be governed, if the parties choose, by some 
domestic law. The parties often have the power to choose. The 
 
 7. Recent forays include David V. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel, in 
MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND 
281 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009); David V. 
Snyder, Contract Regulation, With and Without the State: Ruminations on Rules 
and Their Sources. A Comment on Jürgen Basedow, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 723 
(2008). 
 8. For example, a sale between two businesses will often, by default, be 
governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 89-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. See, e.g., id. 
art. 1 (applying to contracts between parties whose places of business are in 
different states). 
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lawyer, then, must consider the different rules that might be chosen 
to apply to the transaction. Those are real choices and thus 
comparison with a pointed purpose. In my course, then, we cannot 
help but be comparatists in order to be good lawyers. We might 
choose international law. We might choose our own law. Or we 
might choose the law of the other party. We might make yet another 
choice. In any case, we have to compare. 
That realistic exercise is a very different kind of discipline from 
the more theoretical inquiries that tend to dominate comparative 
legal scholarship. I have to admit that when I write about 
comparative law, I am sometimes awakened by nightmares about 
what I’ve done. And a nightmarish fear has certainly made me think 
about the problem. Perhaps if I could name it, the problem would 
disintegrate like other nocturnal phantoms.  
The fundamental problem for me is incommensurability. Outside 
of the context of a particular transaction or case, comparison is 
difficult for me, at least if I am to move beyond simple observations. 
Measurement appears to be somewhere between explosive and 
impossible; insight is largely inarticulate, if not entirely 
incommunicable. Having thought about the problem, and not having 
come to a satisfying conclusion, I thought I would seek help. This 
attempt at help now brings us the constellation currently assembled. 
I have gathered some of the comparatists I most admire and have 
asked them to tell me whether they worry too. Perhaps my concern is 
idiosyncratic. But if they worry too, then how might we feel better? I 
know this hope is wishful, perhaps even childlike, but I hope that 
spending daylight on dark worries will crystallize the real concerns, 
dispel the nightmares, and reveal the most promising paths forward.  
There is a sunnier aspect for our panel as well. The end of the 
congress is for moving forward. Comparatists probably know almost 
as well as historians that looking back is necessary. And we know 
almost as well as philosophers that rigor in thought and expression is 
required. Yet, this necessary work is all in aid of looking forward.  
So I have gathered here a panel of luminaries in comparative law. 
Let us attend to them. 
GEORGE BERMANN: Obviously each member of this panel has 
his or her own personal perspective on what the prevailing 
challenges are in comparative law. That perspective will become 
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clear in what we say, whether explicitly or implicitly.  
Although we have been invited to focus on problems or challenges 
or difficulties, I want to say at the outset that the discipline has made 
considerable progress. I am quite familiar with the critiques that have 
been made of late of the comparative law discipline. I’ve contributed 
to the critiques, but I’ve doubtless also contributed to the 
circumstances that have given rise to those critiques. But I think in 
all modesty that this congress has itself illustrated at least in some 
measure some of the ways in which those critiques have been 
addressed. We have a long way to go, but I am not approaching you 
here in pessimism or in an apologetic mode. 
Still, like everyone else on this panel, I do have some concerns, 
even preoccupations. My principal concern, which has been a 
durable one, relates to the relationship between comparative law and 
its sister disciplines of international law, public and private. 
Comparative law has maintained a stable and steady relationship 
with those fields over the years, a relationship I would characterize 
as symbiotic for reasons I have not the time to develop here. I sense 
that the changes taking place in the world today are putting great 
pressure on the relationship between comparative law and 
international law. So let me try to sketch what I mean and, in so 
doing, distinguish between public and private international law, 
however unfashionable that distinction is today. 
In the opening panel in this room on Monday, considerable 
attention was given to the contribution that comparative law has 
made to the development of public international law. Judge Simma, 
in particular, but not only he, spoke of comparative law as a 
fundamental source of both customary international law and general 
principles of law.  
It can be said without exaggerating that comparative law has 
contributed importantly, alongside other sources, to the creation of 
public international law. Conversely, I believe that public 
international law has contributed importantly to comparative law’s 
sense of mission. Helping develop public international law is by no 
means comparative law’s only mission, far from it. But it is among 
them. In sum, I discern in the relationship between comparative and 
international law a healthy symbiosis whose continuation we have no 
reason to doubt. 
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Elsewhere, I do see a problem, or at least the risk of a problem. It 
has to do, as you may have guessed, with the changing relationship 
between comparative law and private international law. That 
relationship is actually really a much more complicated, intimate and 
even intense one than prevails between comparative law and public 
international law and therefore, by definition, a potentially more 
problematic one. 
Let me focus first on the core of private international law to which 
Judge Simma alluded yesterday, by which I mean such questions as 
jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, choice of law, and recognition of 
foreign judgments. It is commonplace knowledge that neither 
lawyers nor judges can perform the tasks of private international law 
without utilizing comparative law. That alone furnishes the basis for 
an intensely symbiotic relationship as healthy as the one comparative 
law has with public international law. But, I believe there are certain 
changes afoot that present a growing challenge for comparative law 
in its relationship to private international law.  
The change that I would like to highlight for you is the manifest 
increase in transnational relations and operations. In other words, 
comparative law is increasingly put to the service of the practice of 
private international law. The question that arises—only slightly 
though, there is no need to exaggerate—is whether the requirements 
of private international law imply for comparative law not only an 
obvious and reassuring utility but also a potential danger. In my 
experience, the practice of private international law involves a 
significant reduction in the complexity, the richness, and the nuance 
of the law, and foreign law in particular, which is reduced to a series 
of legal propositions sufficiently simplified to feed the machinery of 
the practice of law and of private international law.  
I believe that the appetite private international law has for 
comparative law is only growing. What are the consequences, then, 
for foreign law as a subject and for comparative law as a method? In 
other words, does the utility of comparative law have a price, and if 
so, what is the price? Yet, there is no need to overdramatize the 
situation. This is not, certainly not, the death of comparative law. On 
the contrary, comparative law is in a sense actually valorized by this 
evolution. Comparative law is not being denatured either, because 
comparative law continues to carry out, as always, its function to 
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inform private international law. The challenge is much more subtle: 
Can comparative law, at a time when it is increasingly put at the 
service of private international law—a phenomenon to which I 
contribute—be pursued for its usefulness while safeguarding and 
preserving the character of comparative law, a character that values 
precisely the precious richness of the law, the complexity of the law, 
and its subtleties and nuances? The challenge for comparative law is 
thus, despite its instrumentalization, to continue to make its 
intellectual curiosity, as well its genuine appreciation of ideas, 
prevail over its undeniable practical utility.  
The challenge faced by all disciplines that will last is to find a way 
to fulfill their traditional roles and, at the same time, to adapt 
themselves to new circumstances. For international law—private as 
well as public—the mission is clear in an increasingly globalized 
world. But the path of comparative law is less evident in this new 
landscape, and I believe it is even a little threatened. So, what to do?  
There are three aspects to the role we can play in this regard. Our 
role as scholars is the easiest one to identify, as it is unchanged. We 
can continue to conduct the kind of research and write the kind of 
scholarship that preserves the integrity and authenticity and 
complexity of the fabric of law as a subject and that preserves the 
calling of comparative law. I am not at all worried about the capacity 
and the will of the people in this room to address through the 
traditional methods of legal academia the challenge that I have 
sought to describe.  
Second, as teachers, we must prevent comparative law, both in our 
curricula and in our writing, from becoming eclipsed by the greater 
immediacy and more manifest utility of international law, whether 
public or private. We must bear in mind that it is the kind of 
intellectual curiosity that comparative legal inquiry fosters that 
should drive what we do in the classroom and in our scholarship.  
Third and finally, as jurists who engage with practice, whether as 
authors of expert opinions or as arbitrators or as contributors to the 
construction of new legal institutions and new legal regimes, we 
need to resist the ‘banalisation du droit comparé’ [trivialization of 
comparative law] that can, but need not, accompany the relevance 
that comparative law today enjoys in the practice of international 
law. There I conclude and thank you for your attention. 
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PATRICK GLENN: Thank you Mr. Chair. I come to the podium 
with a keen sense of disappointment, a disappointment which flows 
from the realization that I won’t have the occasion to hear my young 
and brilliant colleague Nicholas Kasirer, already doyen honoraire, as 
they say, of my law school and already ascended to the Quebec 
Court of Appeal. Nicholas is a jurist of great subtlety and great 
originality, who is perhaps best known for his notion of the outre-
langue, or ‘language beyond,’ a general concept designating the 
language which exists as a historical and ongoing source beyond 
each of the particular languages we know today.9 For Nicholas, and 
for me, the language beyond the English language is French, which 
gave so much of its vocabulary, concepts and structures to English, 
and especially to legal English. This is why the adjectives in ‘court 
martial’ and ‘fee simple’ come after the noun. So I will continue 
speaking in that particular derivation from Norman French which we 
today call English. But I will return to Nicholas’ notion of the 
language beyond each language, the outre-langue, to reflect briefly 
on its potential for comparative law. 
There is an absolutely splendid barrage (from the French barrage) 
of criticism in the program about comparative law. And since it was 
expressed partly by David in French, I will return to it in English. If 
you’re the author, David, I congratulate you on this splendid 
polemic. It is said in the program that comparative law has been 
criticized for excessive doctrinalism, a shuttered attitude, timidity in 
approaching broad-gauged study, as well as tendencies to 
superficiality, triviality, obscurantism and exoticization.  
Do I worry about that? I don’t worry about that at all. I think I’m 
guilty of most of that myself. I think I’ve even been guilty of being at 
the same time trivial and obscure. So one can’t worry about this at a 
personal level. What is more encouraging is that I think one can find 
similar criticisms made with respect to most other disciplines, both 
 
 9.  See generally the discussion in Nicholas Kasirer, ‘L’outre-loi’, in ÉTUDIER 
ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT: HIER, AUJOURD'HUI ET DEMAIN—ÉTUDES OFFERTES À 
JACQUES VANDERLINDEN [STUDYING AND TEACHING LAW: YESTERDAY, TODAY, 
AND TOMORROW—STUDIES OFFERED IN HONOR OF JACQUES VANDERLINDEN] 329 
(L. Castonguay & Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2006). 
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by people outside them and, most interestingly perhaps, by people 
within them. So each discipline today goes through crises of one type 
or another. In that, I think comparative law is comparable to many 
other intellectual pursuits. 
I do have a problem, however, with comparative law as a distinct 
discipline. Why do we have a distinct discipline of comparative law? 
Most people say comparative law is a discipline that began with the 
great World Congress in Paris in 1900. I think that’s probably not 
strictly exact, though Professor Blanc-Jouvan may correct me. I think 
the Société de législation comparée was begun in the mid-nineteenth 
century, in the 1860s. So we’ve probably had a recognizable and 
distinct discipline of comparative law for 100 to 200 years. What is 
striking about that—to me—is that the discipline of comparative law 
emerged at the time of the most radical introspection of lawyers in 
the world, at a time of radical state construction, and at a time of 
radical nationalism in law and in other fields of thought.  
Now how should we think about this paradoxical situation? One 
way of thinking about it is optimistic. The optimist says that as the 
world closed down, comparative lawyers opened windows of light 
and maintained contact with other sources in the world. I like to 
think that way myself. But my darker side tells me that it may not 
have been entirely a process of illumination. It may also have been 
the case that comparative lawyers were complicit in nationalistic 
endeavors of the time. You can find support for that notion of 
comparative law as nationalism in the great taxonomic project of 
comparative lawyers, discussed for well over a century, of essentially 
classifying all national legal systems as members of given legal 
families. There is clearly a process of solidification or reification of 
national legal systems in this taxonomic process—national laws as 
autonomous, static, incontrovertible entities. This concept of the task 
of comparative law was therefore state-centric and nationalistic. It 
was very largely Eurocentric.10  
I don’t think this was part of any conspiracy. I don’t think it was 
 
 10.  For the taxonomic project, and use of the biological metaphor of ‘legal 
families,’ contrasted with a more dialogical notion of legal tradition (conceived 
simply as normative information), see H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal 
Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 421-439 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 
2006). 
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the result of any deliberate decisional process of comparative 
lawyers. I think it was probably part of a much larger impression on 
legal thought of the scientific positivism which prevailed at that time. 
What is it to compare? Everybody knows what it is to compare. It’s 
in the dictionaries and anyone can tell you. To compare is to examine 
two things, A and B, and to say how A and B resemble one another 
or differ from one another. That’s it. There’s no hint of normative 
inquiry in the process. It is pure constatation, as they say in French, 
or as we say in Quebec English ‘constatation.’  
It may be that’s why few law students choose to take courses in 
comparative law. They regard it as an oxymoron. Comparison is a 
purely descriptive process. Law is a normative process. How can one 
do both at the same time? So I don’t think what the world needs is a 
discipline of comparative law dedicated to those nineteenth century 
ideas of comparison. We certainly need the data which the social 
sciences provide us, and which many comparative lawyers provide 
us. But there is a real need for the skills and knowledge of 
comparative lawyers in adding a normative dimension to the debate 
about comparative law. My view of the future of comparative law 
follows from that proposition.  
My McGill colleague, Charles Taylor, has written that all 
normative debate is comparative, every normative proposition 
standing in relation to, and alongside, other normative claims.11 I 
think this is the message which comparative law can give to the 
world, and I think this is presently happening. It is most visible in the 
form of transnational judicial dialogue, a normative dialogue which 
is being vigorously pursued today (itself surrounded by normative 
debate).12 This requires us to rethink what it is to compare.  
If our present understanding of comparison doesn’t allow us to do 
 
 11.  CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
IDENTITY 72 (1989) (“Practical reasoning . . . is a reasoning in transitions. It aims 
to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some 
position is superior to some other. It is concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly or 
explicitly, with comparative propositions.”). 
 12.  A recent survey of the debate identified some 3,000 law review 
contributions in the United States alone. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts 
and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 647 (2008). For a recent, 
book-length treatment of the debate, in terms of necessary ‘engagement,’ see VICKI 
C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010). 
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that, then there are useful suggestions in the history of the word 
itself. Where does the English word ‘compare’ come from? It comes 
from the outre-langue of English, French, and the French word 
comparer. Where does the French ‘comparer’ come from? It comes, 
of course, from one of the outre-langues of French, Latin—
specifically the Latin word ‘comparo.’ This is a composite word, 
composed of the word com (or cum), in English ‘with,’ and par, in 
English ‘peer’ or ‘equal.’ So com-paring can be seen as a process of 
existing with an equal, or that which is taken to be an equal, in spite 
of evident differences. It is a process of what was once referred to in 
Spain as convivencia, the process of living together in a non-
conflictual manner in spite of profound differences or beliefs.13  
I think it is today the main task of comparative lawyers to develop 
multiple means of convivencia, as a way of enabling the world to live 
in a non-violent manner. Now the exquisite irony of this is that the 
more successful comparative lawyers become in doing so, the less 
visible comparative law will be as a discipline. Everyone will be 
doing it. There is a clear parallel with Alice in Wonderland’s 
Cheshire Cat who would slowly disappear while smiling. The last 
thing you saw was the smile. Perhaps the last comparative lawyer in 
the world will disappear leaving only a smile [audience laughter]. 
And the smile of the world’s last comparative lawyer will be the sign 
of the ultimate triumph of comparative legal thinking. Thank you 
very much. 
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: I gather that I am on this panel for two 
reasons. First, I am not just an academic law professor but also a 
social scientist. And second, I’ve worked extensively on the part of 
the world formally known as Eastern Europe.  
After 1989, I began studying the political transitions in the former 
Soviet world, focusing on how police states turn into rule of law 
states through dismantling surveillance, bringing police under law, 
increasing procedural guarantees for criminal suspects, increasingly 
parliamentary lawmaking, and generally bolstering transparency, 
 
 13.  The convivencia was that of Muslims, Christians, and Jews during the time 
of Islamic reign in Spain. There is, of course, debate on the extent of their peaceful 
co-existence. For the methods and logic of com-paring, see generally H. Patrick 
Glenn, Com-paring, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 91-105 (Esin Örücü 
and David Nelken eds., 2007). 
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accountability, and rights enforcement. After 2001, I’ve been 
studying the rise and entrenchment of the global anti-terrorism 
campaign. In this campaign, states have been ramping up 
surveillance, giving the police and intelligence services more leeway, 
eliminating procedural guarantees, moving to forms of executive 
lawmaking, and generally decreasing transparency, accountability, 
and rights enforcement. The very aspects of authoritarian governance 
that were dismantled in the post-Soviet transitions all show some 
signs of being newly attractive after 9/11 as states take steps to fight 
terrorism. It’s like déjà vu all over again, but backwards.  
I say this to give you a sense of my frame of reference. The study 
of the transitions out of state socialism on one hand and the rise of 
the anti-terrorism campaign on the other illuminate some particular 
problems in the study of comparative law more generally. In 
particular, I want to address three issues: considering the 
comparative treatment of ideological subjects, attending to the gap 
between law on the books and law in action in comparative 
scholarship, and noting the effects of global trends and global 
institutions as we look at changes in domestic law.  
First, on ideology. Both of my lines of work involve ideological 
subjects and there are specific problems that come with this territory. 
What are ideological subjects? It’s hard to have a neutral view about 
communism, terrorism, and things of this kind. In fact, people who 
work on these topics tend to have strong views in favor of neoliberal 
law over socialist law or human rights concerns over anti-terrorism 
programs—or their inverses. Strong prior beliefs about what is right 
in an ideological battle raise some methodological red flags for 
comparative law.  
For example, for many comparativists who worked across the 
socialist law/non-socialist law divide, there was a tendency to 
compare ideal systems with real ones. During the Cold War, it was a 
commonplace to compare ideal democratic rule of law systems with 
actually existing socialist ones or, if the analysts had the reverse 
politics, they compared ideal socialism with actually existing 
capitalism. Any ideal will look better than any real system, so these 
are not fair comparisons. And the comparison is even more unfair 
when one assesses a system against an ideal that it does not aspire to 
reach. It is easy to caricature the system one doesn’t like by pointing 
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out the ways in which it falls short of an ideal, particularly of some 
ideal that the system in question does not share.  
This practice of flogging legal systems for failing to live up to 
others’ ideals carried over into the post-Soviet world, when those 
who believed that they “won” the Cold War urged countries once on 
the other side to hasten in making their legal systems look as nearly 
as possible like those of their former adversaries. The legal systems 
that have emerged from these changes often lurched toward their 
ideological opposites with predictable results. The lurches failed and 
something altogether more complicated took hold. We can only 
understand what really happened if we stop looking through these 
ideological lenses and recognize the current legal systems in the 
former Soviet world as the mixes of historical legacies and 
complicated aspirations that they are.  
With respect to terrorism, one can also see the dangers of 
ideology. Some who work in the field start from the view that the 
greater danger to human flourishing in an age of terror comes from 
the governments that overreact rather than from the terrorists who 
attack. Others start from the view that the fundamental human right 
at stake is the right to security, which must be guarded against the 
constant danger of terrorist attack. Those who write with security 
clearances cluck-cluck at those naives who are not getting the 
“ghosts and goblins” reports that detail the imminent threats waiting 
in the wings. Those on the outside who focus on the effects of anti-
terrorism policy call attention to the “collateral damage” to human 
rights that such policies have had for Muslim communities as well as 
for communities of dissidents everywhere. Here too, the security 
hawks often fail to see that the values of the human rights advocates 
are not antithetical to security, and the human rights advocates often 
fail in turn to recognize that there may be real threats that need to be 
addressed. A less ideological look at the law and its effects (as well 
as at lawlessness and its aftermath) will reveal that there is much to 
be learned from comparative experience that starts from facts on the 
ground rather than ideologies in the air. Ideal human rights views 
contrasted with the details of an actually existing anti-terror 
campaign will overestimate what is possible, while a security-only 
view overestimates the disruptive effects of rights.  
As a first methodological matter, then, I would counsel that it is 
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unwise to compare the ideal with the real, especially across an 
ideological divide.  
My second methodological point urges that it is also unwise to 
compare doctrine in one system with practice in another. Since many 
of us often compare systems with which we’re very familiar because 
we live in them with systems about which we learn from afar through 
reading, it is a constant temptation to compare the details of the 
systems one knows from daily practice with the doctrinal rules of 
another system one knows about only from reading. The field of 
sociolegal studies has been dedicated to demonstrating that law in 
action is almost always very different from law on the books. If one 
compares the doctrine on one side with the practice on another, one 
is comparing very different beasts, a less helpful enterprise than one 
imagines.  
My role on the panel as a social scientist is to exhort us all to think 
about what we are doing when we compare doctrine from one system 
with practice from another. In every system, we know that there is a 
gap between these two things. And yet somehow it is very hard to 
keep that gap in mind when looking at a number of different legal 
systems precisely because it is extremely difficult to know the 
detailed practice of so many systems without living for long periods 
of time in each place. If we see law as a practiced activity, as 
something that exists as actual habits and practices of people and not 
just as doctrinal categories, we will have a much better grasp of what 
comparative law can tell us. Recognizing the gap between law on the 
books and law in action is necessary if we are to make headway in 
understanding how any legal system works or how one legal system 
is different from another.  
Moreover, and this brings me to my third point, we need to 
understand this relationship between law and practice in a new 
international frame. Our field has assumed for a long time that most 
similarities across legal systems are achieved horizontally—that 
countries borrow legal ideas from other countries, or that they give 
and take transplants. Alternatively, similarities have been imagined 
genealogically through the metaphor of legal families. But in the last 
several decades, we can see the increasing prominence of top-down 
international influence, from international organizations straight into 
domestic legal systems without the usual horizontal or genealogical 
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processes in place. I very much agree with George Bermann that one 
of the key challenges for our field is the increasing role and 
increasing penetration of international law into domestic law. George 
is a specialist in international private law where the dynamic is quite 
different than in international public law where I tend to work. In my 
areas of research—legal transitions and anti-terrorism law—
international institutions have had an enormous effect on the 
landscape of domestic law in parallel ways in multiple countries at 
once. Let me give two examples that illustrate both the gaps between 
law on the books and law in action as well as the increasing 
penetration of domestic law by international law.  
In the former Soviet world, international financial institutions had 
an important say about how countries in the region accomplished 
their transitions. Almost all of the countries of the former Soviet 
world came under International Monetary Fund tutelage at some 
point in that process. When that occurred, the domestic law of 
countries under the IMF-mandated austerity programs could no 
longer be understood primarily in terms of the country’s own internal 
law-making processes. Agreeing to loans from international financial 
institutions required changing domestic law in particular ways, even 
when domestic lawmakers had no desire to do so. As a result, we 
saw sweeping across the former Soviet world programs that slashed 
social safety nets, imposed flatter tax systems, created openings for 
global capital to come into the domestic economy, and took back 
benefits that had been promised to citizens from the Soviet period. 
Much of this was accomplished by law, and the legal effects had to 
be documented back to the international financial institutions to 
show that they had worked. The requirements of the international 
financial institutions not only necessitated legal change, but also 
mandated that there be more than the usual degree of correspondence 
between law and practice. If we as comparativists only examined 
these countries horizontally—comparing Poland with Hungary or 
Russia with Ukraine—we would have missed that these common 
programs sweeping across such a wide swath of the former Soviet 
world were the result of the common mandate of international 
institutions. Moreover, we can see in these austerity programs 
external demands for results, which made law in action rather closer 
than it often is to law on the books.  
In the global anti-terrorism campaign, a series of resolutions of the 
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UN Security Council, Resolution 1373 and others, have required 
states to change their domestic law in specific ways to comply. Here 
too, from the fall of 2001, one could see sweeping across the 
legislative landscape of a surprising array of countries new laws that 
criminalized terrorism offenses, authorized asset freezes of people on 
newly constructed watch lists, permitted new forms of intrusive 
surveillance, and tightened up on refugee and asylum claims. The 
Security Council’s newly formed Counter-Terrorism Committee 
insisted on reports from UN member states that first documented the 
legal changes and then provided statistics on how many terrorists and 
how many dollars were seized through these new mechanisms. 
Doctrinal changes worked very much in parallel but domestic 
compliance with these new laws varied widely. The extraordinary 
similarity of the laws states have passed after 9/11 can only be 
understood by reference to the common international pressure that 
brought those laws about—but the gaps between laws on the books 
and laws in action tell us that doctrinal change doesn’t mean that law 
hits the ground in the same way in all places.  
In particular, some states seem to have passed anti-terrorism laws 
to comply with these Security Council mandates and just stopped 
there, while other states have used the draconian new anti-terrorism 
laws to rout their domestic opposition or to carry out their own 
unique programs of repression rather than to fight global terrorism in 
parallel with other states. So, for example, even though Vanuatu 
passed an anti-terrorism statute that was nearly bigger than the 
country itself, the statute has not been used at all. By contrast, 
Thailand adopted an anti-terrorism law on the Security Council 
model and that law has been actively deployed. But the anti-
terrorism law in Thailand has not been used to fight the kind of 
global terrorism that the Security Council had in mind. Anti-
government protestors occupying the main square in Bangkok were 
forcibly dispersed by the government in spring 2010, and many were 
shot and killed. Even though these protestors were not at all 
connected to the global war on terror, those protestors who were 
arrested were charged under the anti-terrorism laws that the Security 
Council required Thailand to adopt. Having similar laws on the 
books in Vanuatu and Thailand did not produce similar uses of these 
laws in practice. These two examples—which could be endlessly 
multiplied—show that global templates emanating from international 
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organizations may be adopted by different countries in very similar 
ways. But one must look to the practice to understand they are being 
used for highly different purposes from place to place. Having 
similar laws on the books does not necessarily begin to demonstrate 
that these laws are carried out the same way everywhere.  
So then, how should we think about comparative law as we meet 
at this international congress? The examples I have just given show 
that we should no longer think of domestic law as particularly self-
contained. The more that countries become enmeshed in global 
institutions, the more they adopt templates that allow them to adapt 
to the forces of globalization. And so increasingly, domestic law is 
being changed through the effects of international institutions. But 
even though international law may be becoming increasingly 
important for understanding comparative law, it is only the 
comparative lawyer who can see just what this means in practice.  
In my remarks today, I have tried to call attention to three 
problems – the dangers of working in ideological subjects where 
there is a tendency to compare one system’s legal practice with 
another system’s legal ideals, the problem with failing to see that law 
in action is quite different than law on the books and the necessity of 
recognizing that the forces of globalization mean that domestic law is 
changing rapidly in response to the top-down pressures of 
international institutions. In thinking about these three problems, 
however, a single solution suggests itself: more careful, observant 
and patient comparative law research.  
AMR SHALAKANY:14 Good morning. Bonjour. And sabah el-
kheir! If we’re going to introduce French heavily on this panel, then 
we might as well include my mother tongue, Arabic. But don’t 
worry, I won’t impose that on you now. Not yet!  
As George mentioned, a lot of our views on where comparative 
law stands today and how we can take our discipline ahead happen to 
be quite autobiographical—and such is certainly the case in my own 
work. More specifically, my biggest challenge for the last couple of 
 
 14.  Because of the advent of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Professor Shalakany 
was not able to participate fully in editing these remarks. The editors have worked 
with, and we hope remained faithful to, his text, but he has not been able to check 
all editorial changes. His remarks in response to the interventions from the 
audience could not be included for similar reasons. 
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years has been to grapple with how Islamic law has been 
traditionally defined as a field of comparative legal studies, pretty 
much since 1932 when the First Hague Congress of Comparative 
Law passed a resolution put forward by the Egyptian Delegation, and 
adopted ‘à main levée,’ formally reserving “dans le prochain 
Congrès, une place à l’étude du droit islamique non seulement 
comme source de droit comparé.”15 That to my mind was the 
historical moment when my field became a subject of comparative 
law, a deeply emotional moment for the Egyptian Delegation which 
returned back to Cairo beaming with nationalist pride that Islamic 
law has finally made it on an equal footing with civil law and 
common law, and a deeply disciplinary moment out of which came 
an entire field of study concerned with finding functional analogues 
across these three legal traditions, all the way from family law to 
banking and finance.  
My biggest challenge is the definition put forward since 1932 at 
the Hague Congress on what constitutes ‘Islamic law’ for 
comparatist purposes. See, if you’re going to study Islamic law, then 
what you’re fundamentally studying is Islamic legal history because, 
as you all know, Islamic law is not fundamentally thought of today 
as a law in action, but rather a law that existed in the past and then 
was replaced after the colonial encounter by a variety of civil and 
common law transplants from the late nineteenth century onwards. In 
that historical understanding of Islamic law as fundamentally a thing 
of the past, there is one definition that dominates comparative legal 
studies since 1932, which must now come to grapple with very 
serious critiques that demand of us a rethink of what constitutes 
Islamic law.  
To give this a bit of a theoretical framework, I’m going to use the 
work of the French philosopher and historian Paul Veyne, 
specifically a beautiful short book published back in 1971 called 
Comment on écrit l’histoire, or “how we write history,” in which he 
introduces something called “[l]a notion d’intrigue.” According to 
Veyne, for the historian “les faits n’existent pas isolément, en ce sens 
que le tissu de l’histoire est ce que nous appellerons une intrigue, un 
 
 15. Translation to English: The Congress passed a resolution by show of hands 
formally reserving, in the next Congress, a place for the study of Islamic law not 
exclusively as a source of comparative law. 
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mélange très humain et très peu « scientifique » de causes 
matérielles, de fins et de hasards . . . . Le mot d’intrigue a l’avantage 
de rappeler que ce qu’étudie l’historien est aussi humain qu’un 
drame ou un roman, Guerre et Paix ou Antoine et Cléopâtre.” In 
answering the question, “Quels sont donc les faits qui sont dignes de 
susciter l’intérêt de l’historien ?,” Veyne answers “Tout dépend de 
l’intrigue choisie; en lui même, un fait n’est ni intéressant, ni le 
contraire. . . . car le fait n’est rien sans son intrigue . . . . [E]n 
histoire comme au théatre, tout montrer est impossible, non parce 
qu’il faudrait trop de pages, mais parce qu’il n’existe pas de fait 
historique élémentaire . . . .”16  
What does that mean? Basically for Veyne, if one is going to write 
history, including legal history, then one by default is engaging in an 
‘intrigue’—and the best English translation for ‘intrigue’ I could 
think of is a ‘plot,’ both in the amusing literary sense of the term 
(such as an interesting plot of action underlying a good play or 
novel), but also a ‘plot’ in the more darkly conspiratorial sense. 
Islamic legal history, as the core of my comparative legal studies, 
can also fall under one of three alternative plots. So what I’ll do for 
the remainder of my time is I’ll take you through first, what has been 
the dominant plot of Islamic law history since the Hague Congress of 
1932; second, how this plot has been challenged by two alternative 
plots over the last 20 to 30 years; and then three, why you should 
care as comparative lawyers engaged in Islamic law between these 
alternative plots. 
The first plot, which is the dominant plot, boils down pretty much 
to the following—if you’re going to study Islamic law, then the 
doctrines that you are studying have to be derived from some 
 
 16. PAUL VEYNE, COMMENT ON ECRIT L’HISTOIRE: TEXTE INTEGRAL [HOW WE 
WRITE HISTORY : FULL TEXT] 51-53 (1971). Translated to English: “Facts do not 
exist individually in the sense that the structure of history is what we will call a 
plot; a very human but not so much scientific mix of material causes, ends, and 
hazards. The word ‘plot’ has the advantage of calling to mind that what the 
historian studies is as human as a drama or a novel such as War and Peace or 
Antony and Cleopatra.” In answering the question: “Which facts are worthy of the 
historian’s interest?” Veyne answers: “Everything depends on the chosen plot. In 
itself, a fact is neither interesting nor uninteresting because the fact is nothing 
without its plot. Thus, in history as in theatre, showing everything is impossible, 
not because it would require too many pages, but because there is no elementary 
historical fact.” 
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scripturally revealed text. This means, basically, either the Koran or 
the Sunna of Prophet Mohammad or Ijmaa (a matter about which 
there is scholarly juristic consensus), or alternatively Qiyas, which is 
analogical reasoning derived from any of these three sources. 
Anything that is outside of these four scriptural sources of Islamic 
law does not merit study by a comparative lawyer interested in 
Islamic law.  
There is a huge problem with that scriptural definition of Islamic 
law, namely that it does not include a whole variety of judicial 
structures and doctrinal arrangements that have existed since at least 
the time of the Byzantines, and which have been later collected under 
the doctrine of siyasa shar’iyya, or in French ‘politiques juridiques’ 
[legal policies]. These doctrines are dismissed from the study of the 
comparative lawyer, indeed from the study of the historian of Islamic 
law generally, as being either ‘secular’ or from ‘extra-Sharia’ 
jurisdictions—certainly for the two leading scholars of Islamic law 
history, Schacht and Coulson.  
This means that in Plot No. 1, which continues to be the plot 
dominant until now, you are relying on a particular set of primary 
materials which happen to be juristic textbooks of fiqh or Islamic 
jurisprudence, textbooks that come in various lengths and forms but 
are fundamentally written by jurists, for jurists, and about jurists. 
And that story is not of a law in action but rather a law in books. It’s 
not about what people are doing in courts, it’s rather how the jurists 
theorized the legal system as a whole.  
This particular conception of Islamic law came under attack from 
the 1970s onwards particularly after the publication of Edward 
Said’s book, Orientalism. The concern was that the conception of 
Islamic law presented there makes Islamic law exactly the radical 
opposite of any form of Western law, whether it’s civil or common. 
If the history of Western law has been a history of evolutionary 
functionalism—Western law develops over time in order to deal with 
changing needs of society or indeed leading these societies to its new 
reactions—Islamic law, by contrast, seems to be almost 
dysfunctionally resistant to evolution, in the sense that there’s one 
right answer, God revealed it, it has to be based in one of the 
scriptural sources, and it applies today just as it applied a thousand 
years before. 
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Against this, a second plot emerged from the 1970s onwards 
which has a very clear anti-orientalist streak to it. Without getting 
into much detail, this plot is fundamentally a variation on Plot No. 1.; 
it relies on the same set of primary materials—again juristic 
textbooks without looking at all these other institutions that existed 
in practice, but argues that Islamic law has actually developed here 
and there by tweaking some of the major historical moments of its 
development.  
I don’t have much time so I’ll move on to Plot No. 3, which by 
contrast has emerged now for the last almost 10 years. It’s very 
different from the two other plots because first, by way of primary 
materials, it looks at Ottoman court records as opposed to juristic 
textbooks. Second, it does not tell the history of Islamic law as a law 
of jurists, but rather tells a history of Islamic law by looking at the 
history of people coming to court, something that we might call 
subaltern history. And third, it gives you a sense of Islamic law as 
something much more changing and developing over time than the 
other two plots would concede.  
This Plot No. 3, which I would call a new historiography of 
Islamic law, has so far been marginalized both in defining Islamic 
law as a field of legal history, and therefore also as a field of 
comparative legal studies. I would argue that if one wants to move 
forward in dealing with Islamic law in comparative law, then one 
should take Plot No. 3 a bit more seriously. And I hope the stakes in 
taking it seriously are evident in the paper that is distributed on your 
tables.  
If one is interested in comparing the governance of sexual crimes 
under Islamic law before the colonial encounter, and if you stick with 
Plots No. 1 or 2, then you are also stuck with the hudood table on the 
first side of the page, which basically states a number of 
punishments, distinctively harsh, from stoning to lashings, but also 
reveals a set of background norms of evidence and privacy that 
effectively stop them from being applied in practice. You flip the 
paper on the other side and you find alternative siyasa punishments 
for the same crimes, not lashings or stonings this time, but a series of 
fines that vary depending on the social class of the person who is 
being accused.  
And so at stake in choosing what kind of Islamic law we will deal 
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with in comparative law between Plot No. 3 and Plots 1 and 2 is first, 
a very clear distinction between lashings and stonings on the one 
hand and fines on the other; second, for someone who is interested, 
as myself, in a progressive transformation of Islamic law in the 
future, if you include siyasa as part of your study of Islamic law, as 
opposed to the dominant tradition in scholarship today, then the very 
definition of your discipline becomes unclear.  
And this is where I am torn. It seems on the one hand that it’s 
much better to be fined than it is to be lashed or stoned. On the other 
hand, the evidentiary barriers to conviction that exist at the bottom of 
the first table and that effectively stop Islamic law from ever being 
applied might also take you in an opposite direction. It might be 
actually better for you to stick with Plot No. 1 because it might 
actually provide more safeguards in keeping the state outside of the 
bedroom.  
This has been an incredibly short and brief description but I’m 
glad to expand it more in questions and answers. Thank you. 
ELISABETH ZOLLER: First, I would like to thank Professor 
David Snyder for having invited me on this panel and for giving us 
such good directions as to what we should talk about this morning. 
Each of us was invited, to all feasible extent, to choose a particular 
theme among the numerous problems of the discipline comparative 
law. My own theme deals with the indeterminacy of the discipline—
what I could also term the uncertain object of comparative law.  
What makes me uncomfortable in comparative law is the 
indeterminate nature of the discipline. What is its goal? What is its 
end? What are we trying to do, to prove, or to achieve when we 
compare legal systems?  
Where is the need to ask such metaphysical questions, will you 
say? My answer is based upon Jean de la Fontaine’s advice, the 
French fabulist who recommended in The Fox and the Goat: 
“Whatever way you wend, consider well the end.”17 
 
 17. JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, Le Renard et le Bouc [The Fox and the Goat], in 
OEUVRES COMPLETES: FABLES CONTES ET NOUVELLES [COMPLETE WORKS: 
FABLES AND SHORT STORIES] 115 (Jean-Pierre Collinet ed., 1991), translated in 
Jean de la Fontaine, The Fox and the Goat, ETURAMA.COM, 
http://www.eturama.com/histoires/the-fox-and-the-goat-1068 (last visited Jul. 1, 
2011). 
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This is wise advice. How many of us have a clear vision of what 
we are doing and where we are going? Personally, I must confess 
that I have difficulties to give clear and straightforward answers to 
such questions. 
Of course, the indeterminate nature of the object of comparative 
law varies according to each comparatist. There are as many uses 
made of comparative law as there are individuals interested in it. 
Nonetheless, what is striking is that, in spite of their diversity, all of 
these individuals, with a few exceptions, seem to see the discipline 
only as useful, and sometimes even under a utilitarian doctrine. 
Comparative law is now entirely dominated by an instrumental 
approach. President Bermann said it very well before me. It is 
perceived as a means to an end, one end only, which is to resolve 
concrete practical problems.  
Foreign laws are like objects displayed on the shelves of a big 
legal Walmart. Everybody walks by with a cart, taking one or several 
articles that they need to resolve a particular problem. Foreign laws 
are no longer objects of study. They are products, consumer 
products, regarded as quick fixes to pressing needs. In the worse 
cases, they are considered as convenient means to respond to 
embarrassing popular demands and to follow through on hazardous 
electoral promises. True, this consumer approach may turn out to be 
useful more often than not. But I have difficulty to conceive 
comparative law as a toolbox only. 
The utilitarian function of comparative law cannot be questioned, 
and should be pursued. Yet, comparative law should not be reduced 
to that. For a scholar—I mean a scholar educated in the tradition of 
classic humanities who was taught that what matters is not to resolve 
problems but to formulate them—the utilitarian approach does not 
permit us to understand the diversity of legal worlds, and even less to 
make sense of them.  
We live in a world where everything is globalized, but in which 
legal systems remain as diverse as they were in the last century. If 
there has in fact been interpenetration of the public law systems, 
notably between European states, I do not believe—no, I do not 
believe that we can speak of a standardization of public law, even 
through international law. Regarding the issues of government 
organization, the purposes of the State, the notion of State itself, a 
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real abyss exists between the American and European conceptions of 
public law.  
Regarding the content of public law, it is not true that only judges 
guarantee rights and liberties. Jean Carbonnier was right when he left 
it up to a civil code and a public prosecutor to guarantee freedom. In 
countries of codified law, freedom starts with the legislator. On this 
side of the Atlantic, things are seen differently. But why? Isn’t it 
something that should be explained? The main task of the 
comparative legal scholars does not fundamentally differ from that 
which Montesquieu had given himself on the threshold of the The 
Spirit of Laws. 
“I have, first of all, considered mankind; and the result of my 
thoughts has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and 
manners, they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.”18  
It is not enough to know how the law works to explain the 
diversity of legal systems and make sense of them. In the same 
manner that, in 1987, Allan Bloom worried about Closing of the 
American Mind, closing of the comparative mind is one of the 
greatest dangers we must face.  
The turn has come for the comparatists to be “des juristes 
inquiets,” that is—concerned lawyers for their discipline, as the 
French civilists were for theirs in 1929, according to the adjective 
Paul Cuche used to describe critics of the school of exegesis.19 In 
order to stop the appalling depletion of the legal thought that 
threatens legal education, we must bring humanities and social 
sciences back to law school; we must resist the temptation to make it 
a professional school only. Yes, there is room for humanism at law 
school, as it is true that their function is not to produce filled minds 
but good minds. Thank you. 
 
 18.  CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS xliii (Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914).  
 19. See Marie-Claire Belleau, The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and 
Criticism in Early Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379, 380 
(defining “juristes inquiets” as “worried or anxious” French legal academics whose 
goal was to overthrow legal classicism and renew French legal thought at the end 
of the nineteenth century). 
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INTERVENTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE 
AUDIENCE20 
CHRISTIAN ARMBRUSTER: Thank you very much. I just want 
to make a few remarks about the notion of legal families just used by 
Patrick Glenn. I think one of the key challenges to comparative law 
nowadays is to reassess the concept of legal families because the 
good old days—when we easily divided the world into legal 
families—are obviously over . . . . I think a reassessment in any case 
is necessary. . . . We have heard a lot about the growing influence of 
international law on national legal orders. . . . So I have a question 
for Professor Glenn: Where does that leave the notion and concept of 
legal families? 
TALIA EINHORN: I am from Israel. I also wanted to respond to 
Patrick Glenn about the Cheshire cat at the end. One of the first 
chapters of the Bible tells the story of the Tower of Babel when the 
people had one language and one word—the same words. And the 
story, of course, is that they wanted to build the Tower of Babel and 
God came and confused their languages and dispersed them over the 
Earth and that was the end of that story. 
Now some say it was a punishment but in fact, another 
commentary says it was the saving of humanity because when people 
speak the same language and have the same words or ideas, 
essentially, it is problematic because a variety of thought is lacking. 
So I like much better your idea of convivencia, the same as living 
next to each other—existing next to each other because in fact, one 
of the greatest things about comparative law is reflecting upon our 
own system in a completely different way after we’ve stepped down 
and looked at it and really understood what makes the differences. 
So, I think this is one of the objects of comparative law. And thank 
you very much for a wonderful time. 
LOUIS DEL DUCA: I will first thank the panel for a very 
stimulating and informative presentation. And as I listened to the 
 
 20. Many of the interventions were not entirely audible in the recording and 
thus not available for transcription. The editors, with apologies to intervenors, have 
done their best to state the sense of each intervention. In addition, not all 
intervenors are audibly identified in the recording, so not all can be identified here. 
As with the panelists’ presentations, all French is here translated into English by 
the editors. 
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presentation, I was impelled to parlay the comments that the panel 
made to the development of teaching materials particularly in the 
post-World War II period. When George Bermann talked about the 
new concern, interest and focus on public international law, I looked 
back at the casebooks and materials that we were utilizing in the ’50s 
and ’60s and ’70s. And you compare that now with the kinds of 
materials and new kinds of subject matters that we’re addressing, I’m 
optimistic as I look at that development.  
We now have the public law component and the comparative 
teaching is evident in new constitutional law comparative books that 
didn’t exist until relatively recently on this side of the Atlantic. And 
we look at the new kind of development of teaching materials like 
the West Publishing Company series of books which are addressed to 
the task of providing law teachers who have not had exposure to 
comparative law training and experiences with materials that relate 
contract laws specifically in a comparative context, injecting CISG 
kinds of materials into that field. And it’s comparably in the 
constitutional law field, judicial review on a comparative basis. None 
of that really existed until relatively recently.  
I look at what’s happening in Europe and on this panel for 
example. The panel put on a wonderful presentation that we had 
from Justice Ginsburg and Miguel Maduro. Here is the European 
Union in its own fantastic integration of this great experiment in a 
public kind of institutional development that has occurred there—
unique in the history of the world. But they’re not satisfied to just 
think of themselves as such; after all, what did Miguel Maduro tell us 
yesterday—that they’re in the process of forming a global 
governance program in thinking beyond their own limitation. And 
this includes talk about the vertical imposition of rules, combined 
with transplant processes, moving beyond the historical horizontal 
process. 
I’m merely trying to suggest that new horizons have been 
developed—and very constructively, very creatively. And the fact 
that this has occurred leads me to be rather optimistic about what the 
developments are, where the use of comparative law not only for 
academic purposes, not only for skills training to develop expertise 
to handle private counseling. I think what has evolved in the recent 
years is a concern, a motivation to utilize comparative law to develop 
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new institutions, new structures that can address the problems that 
need to be addressed.  
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I’ll join the chorus here. I take issue 
with Professor Bermann’s comment. If I understood it correctly, the 
appearance of public international law and private international law 
elevates utility over practicality. I think that for comparative law—in 
my class I focus on this, I have a practice background—the most 
important thing in international practice is understanding where your 
clients come from. And for that you need to know comparative law. 
That’s the most important thing in practice.  
I would say the other really practical value is—one of the panelists 
already said this—any law reform is comparative. So I would just 
agree with the other side in this fashion, that that’s the core basis. 
And I think it’s still perfectly valuable. 
OLEKSIY KRESIN: Oleksiy Kresin, Ukraine. I have a comment 
and a question for Patrick Glenn. You mentioned something about 
the history of comparative law and the start of this history. Two 
centuries ago in 1810, Paul Feuerbach mentioned comparative law as 
an academic discipline, called comparative legal science. If we take 
this as a starting point, maybe Feuerbach’s commentary should be 
taken to be a sign of a well-established comparative legal science as, 
perhaps, he assembled the first well-established treatise on 
comparative law as general subject.  
You know it’s an eternal question—what is the starting point of 
comparative law? But you know it’s quite curious when you point to 
1869 and the creation of the French Society of Comparative 
Legislation as a starting point because in the same year, we had in 
Ukraine, in Kiev, a treatise on the history of comparative law. So 
how could this have started in 1869 when the history of comparative 
law was already being written? Thank you. 
RALF MICHAELS: Ralf Michaels, Duke University. There is a 
certain call on the panel, as I take it, to have more sophistication in 
comparative law. However, it seems to me that one problem of 
comparative law in action where it is most influential—in the World 
Bank, in the Rule of Law Project of the American Bar Association—
is that these projects do not even reach the modest level of 
sophistication that we comparative lawyers already have, or put 
differently, that there is almost no comparative law in these projects 
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at all. So, to take Islamic law as an example—as misguided or 
shocking as its understanding by many comparative lawyers may be, 
this understanding is still more informed than that of many law 
reformers and of people advocating war against Islamic countries. 
So my question is: what do we, as comparative lawyers, do with 
this situation? Do we, firstly, say we try to dumb down our work so 
as to make sure our work remains relevant in these projects? Or, 
secondly, do we emphasize the complexity of comparative law in 
order to try to keep back such governance projects, by telling them 
that things are actually not as easy as they take them to be? Or, 
thirdly, do we say we are in fact a non-interventionist discipline, so 
we remain on the sidelines and we critique from the outside while we 
observe? I am personally quite unsure which of the three options, 
each of which sounds quite unattractive, we should actually take. But 
that seems to be, to me at least, the biggest task that we have as 
comparative lawyers right now—to determine how we engage with 
these governance projects of which we are not a part. 
ADRIEN WING: I am Adrien Wing from the University of Iowa. 
I’d like to congratulate the panel for the wonderful perspectives. I’m 
particularly delighted that Professor Shalakany was here who was 
able to speak not only in English and French but also could have 
done the whole thing in Arabic as well and probably several other 
languages. And so I have loved this discussion but I think, for the 
future, I have a plea that it would be really great if at the next 
international congress we could actually not worry as much, “Have 
we closed down?” but “When will we open up so that we will hear 
the voices of the majority of the world who are not in this room?” 
And so because of the nature of this discipline and how it has 
evolved over time, we’re still, in the twenty-first century, literally 
only hearing from a small portion of the world—as I was just looking 
around this room. And so I think we really need the voices of the 
majority of the world, whether we are talking about many more 
people from Asia, a mass of people would be from Africa, the 
Middle East and so forth. I’m glad to see there are some Latin 
American people here. But we need more voices in the dialogue or 
else we’re just kind of perpetuating the kind of things that Edward 
Said and others with the orientalist kind of discipline said—we’re 
just talking to each other and we’re not really getting their 
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perspectives. And the majority of the world may have very different 
ideas about lots of these issues. 
And because of the problems with so much wealth, as represented 
in this room, and not enough wealth from the majority of these 
countries, I think it would great if somehow we could get the 
resources in the next four years to assemble critical masses from a 
variety of countries. And I don’t know if that’s by foundations 
sponsoring people or by different institutions here at the Society 
sponsoring people. So we could update these debates with many of 
the voices that are not in the room.  
And I’m hoping, as Patrick was saying, that there would be this 
Cheshire cat with a grin. And the grin would come about from the 
joy that would come from hearing from the majority of the world 
scholars and practitioners on these topics. Thank you. 
NICOLÁS ETCHEVERRY: I will just follow up your thoughts. 
Thank you for this wonderful panel. And I would like to congratulate 
you all. A special thanks to Professor Elisabeth Zoller for what she 
said about warning us about the risk and danger of finding 
comparative law only a consumer product and having only a very 
utilitarian view of it. She quoted Montesquieu and the infinite variety 
of mankind. And that is if that infinite variety of mankind is not 
telling us to become those voices of the world that are not listened to 
today, then we are in debt. The infinite variety of mankind forces us 
to understand, respect, and love each other, each time more, and each 
time better. And if humanism and human sciences do not intersect 
with comparative law, then comparative law loses its meaning and its 
goal. Thank you very much. 
PABLO LERNER: Pablo Lerner, Ramat Gan School of Law, 
Israel. And I have a question to Professor Shalakany. As a matter of 
fact, I continue the path of Professor Wing. I have read your article 
addressing the adoption of foreign ideas in Egypt.  
During this congress I was asking different people about their 
thoughts on the following idea: I don’t know how it is possible to 
seek harmonization and multiculturalism. So this is what led me to 
the question. On one hand we study for a world of codification; on 
the other hand, there are a lot of people who want multiculturalism, 
pluralism, and so on. Furthermore, the problem of harmonization 
continues. They do not have a very clear role in this process. They do 
2011] COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 963 
not play the game. And I am not sure of even in the following 
congress there will be 300 persons from China, 300 persons from 
Europe, 300 scholars from Guatemala. Honestly, I do not know. And 
especially that you have to deal with this question. So perhaps you 
can help me finish the congress on this matter. Thank you. 
SYMEON SYMEONIDES: Thank you, David. I shall be brief. I 
don’t think it should matter when comparative law began, but since 
several dates were mentioned, let me give you another date. How 
about 700 BC? When Solon, the lawmaker in Athens, was asked to 
draft the laws of Athens, do you know what he did before that? He 
traveled around the known world, at least the Mediterranean villages. 
He studied the customs and went back home and drafted laws based 
on the wisdom or experience of that excursion. So in a sense, 
comparative law, or at least the idea of observation, began then. And 
I’m sure there are other examples in history where the laws of other 
countries were recognized before, but I don’t know. 
Another point on George’s take on the connection between private 
international law and comparative law: I think that connection is 
becoming increasingly close. I will give you an example. In the old 
days, we used to choose the applicable law based on the context of 
all states with a relationship. You didn’t need to know what you were 
choosing. In fact, you were not supposed to care what you were 
choosing until after you had made the choice and then you have the 
ordre public exception and so on. So a lot has changed since then. At 
least in the United States, and increasingly in other countries in the 
world, we care very much what we choose and why we choose it. 
And we believe that there cannot be an intelligent choice unless you 
know and understand very well the laws which you choose. As a 
result, that has made choice of law far more complex but it also 
increases its dependence on comparative law. It made choice of law 
more uncertain but we believe it made it more rational. So the 
relation continues, and it is becoming even more intense. Thank you 
very much for an excellent, excellent time and an excellent congress. 
Thank you. 
RESPONSES FROM THE PANEL 
ELISABETH ZOLLER: I would like to react to the interaction 
between public international law and comparative law. I’m very 
964 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:4 
skeptical about ‘narrowing the gap’ between public international law 
and comparative law because I do not see how comparative law has 
changed public international law. Here, of course, I’m not referring 
to private international law, which is something quite different and 
must be governed by domestic laws in the absence of international 
treaties or conventions.  
As far as public international law is concerned, I’m sorry to say I 
do not see many changes which would have been triggered by 
comparative law in the basic norms of public international law that 
apply to the subjects of international law, the law of treaties, or 
international responsibility. I don’t think that comparative law has 
modified these fundamental principles. International law—public 
international law—remains the law of a society of states. 
Now where it comes to the interactions that can be made in private 
and public international law, I think that in this country, we have a 
tendency to view the two as very similar or let’s say to view the two 
as forming a continuum. I doubt that in other parts of the world, the 
view is the same. I would suggest that federalism as a basic tenet in 
the constitutional structure of the country is very important in that 
respect. Thank you. 
AMR SHALAKANY: [Remarks were largely inaudible and must 
unfortunately be omitted.]21 
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: I would like to address the problem of 
socialist law. Of course, if you look at comparative law in textbooks 
before a certain date, socialist law appears as one of the great legal 
families. But it has now apparently disappeared. I want to suggest 
that it actually lives on. Ironically, one of the places where socialist 
law has been preserved is in the United States. If you look at the 
jurisprudence of the Warren Court in the 1950s and 1960s, in 
criminal procedure decisions in particular, it was a common practice 
for the Supreme Court to cite Soviet sources and to say that if the 
Soviet Union does things this way, we will do the opposite. Soviet 
law lives on in the constitutional criminal procedure of the Warren 
Court—or what remnants of those decisions still remain.  
In addition, law from the socialist period still exists as law in the 
books in many post-Soviet places. Labor law, which had not been 
 
 21.  See supra note 14. 
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enforced as written in the Soviet period, suddenly came to be 
enforced by courts taking law seriously in the 1990s after socialism 
was gone. Or social rights were for the first time universally enforced 
only after the Soviet Union collapsed. Practice changed, even when 
the letter of the law remained largely intact. 
The IMF targeted the post-socialist states’ enforcement of social 
rights provisions in constitutional law in the early years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. But the IMF’s insistence on shredding 
social safety nets came into conflict with the IMF’s Rule of Law 
projects. The constitutional courts of both Russia and Hungary made 
extraordinary decisions in the mid-1990s announcing that there was a 
constitutional limit to how much social rights programs could be cut 
back in the course of these austerity programs. The reactions of the 
governments in Russia and Hungary to these constitutional 
pronouncements were actually very different, however. In Russia, 
President Yeltsin paid no attention to the Constitutional Court. Their 
decisions were simply ignored, and the austerity programs were 
pushed through as the IMF insisted. In Hungary, however, where the 
government really didn’t actually want to cut back social programs to 
begin with, the government went back to the IMF after the 
Constitutional Court decisions and said, we have a Constitutional 
Court that tells us we can’t construct the austerity program the way 
you would like us to, and of course, you wouldn’t want us to violate 
the decision of our Court, would you? The IMF backed down, and 
the Hungarian Government was able to use the decisions of the Court 
to renegotiate the bargain with the IMF. 
On the question of legal families and international law in the anti-
terrorism campaign, the program of laws that countries must adopt is 
universal and doesn’t depend on a country’s own legal history. But 
one sees great differences both in the ways that laws are adapted to 
fit the specifics of each country’s legal systems and also the ways 
that laws are applied. For example, the Security Council framework 
requires an extraordinary amount of change in banking regulation. 
Financial transactions must be made more visible to states. And yet 
in some countries, data privacy has been entrenched in ways that 
require local adaptation of this mandate. As a result, most states are 
adopting these laws as required by the Security Council, but they are 
doing so in slightly different ways. The same is true in the area of 
criminal law where again the Security Council Framework requires 
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the criminalization not only of terrorism but also of inchoate crimes 
like conspiracy. And of course, systems vary a lot in whether 
inchoate crimes are permissible in the system of criminal law. 
Sometimes states will adopt these new laws and then not enforce 
them.  
As a result, I think what we’re seeing is that international law 
produces pressure toward the standardization of law, but that cultural 
differences among legal systems emerge when these laws have to be 
locally adopted, interpreted, and then applied.  
PATRICK GLENN: Thank you. Thank you for all of those 
comments and those from the panel as well. Some of the comments 
suggest to me all of the obstacles that are before us. And all of these 
obstacles are before us in a time of globalization essentially because 
of the confrontational and conflictualist teaching of the last two or 
three centuries.  
 We see that in private international law where the dominant 
language is that of conflicts of law. In the 11th edition, I think of 
Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, the authors state in their 
discussion of the name of the subject that ‘laws may differ but they 
do not conflict.’ Yet the authors conclude that the language of 
conflict should be retained because of the ‘obvious inconvenience’ of 
changing a name in use since the seventeenth century. In public 
international law, as was just said by Professor Zoller, we have the 
idea that the law is exclusively that of states. But once again you 
think in terms of the conflictual relations between states and, of 
course, the law of war is historically a dark part of the discipline of 
public international law. 
 Those are all lawyer problems. The real problem I think that 
societies face today is the result of teaching ‘what law is’ to the 
public of our countries. We have taught for the last two or three 
centuries that the basic form of human organization is what is called 
a ‘nation state.’ And every nation state should be uniform. There 
should be coincidence between the nation and the state. And publics 
therefore react faced with irritants to that uniformity, which should 
be the rule according to the teaching given for the last two or three 
centuries. So we see riots. We see killings when there are 
suggestions of deviation from what is taken to be a uniform norm of 
law and governance. 
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 There has never been and there never will be a nation state. 
But we have not taught that. We have not taught in reality how 
successful states are successful. Diversity exists but it is within them, 
as with the convivencia that the Spanish identified and were very 
successful in implementing for a long period of centuries. So the 
task, I think, of being comparative lawyers of the future is to attract 
attention to the actual complexity of human relationships. And Ralf, 
it’s not for us to dumb down the World Bank; it’s doing a good 
enough job of that itself [audience laughter]. 
GEORGE BERMANN: Thank you. And of course, those were all 
very stimulating and, in some cases, provocative comments. What I 
sought to convey in my remarks is the challenge of performing 
comparative law on a level of sophistication that’s appropriate for the 
task to which it’s being harnessed. And I think that the message that I 
think Elisabeth Zoller shares with me is not that we should deny the 
utility of comparative law, that we should deny its utilitarian 
dimension, but that we should labor with extreme effort to preserve 
that which is not utilitarian about comparative law. 
And that's why I don't quite understand some of the remarks made 
earlier in the conversation to the effect that we on the panel are 
questioning the utility of comparative law for the discharge of a 
variety of functions. Comparative law is expected to deliver different 
goods according to the function it is meant at any given time to 
serve. Some functions may call for a high degree of sophistication, 
while others demand law in more easily digestible form. Frankly it's 
the variety of our missions that's presenting us with the biggest 
challenge. 
The final comment I want to make is not unrelated to Professor 
Adrien Wing’s. I think it’s related. I think that every one of these 
conferences should focus less on, or not focus exclusively on, the 
utilitarian value of comparative law, and instead the focus should be 
on the more cosmopolitan and more inclusive and more spacious 
concept of the community in which we’re investing ourselves. I think 
we are trying to move in that direction, but I would be the first to 
agree with Adrien that conferences such as these have done a great 
deal to make up ground in regard to the cosmopolitan composition. 
The degree of cosmopolitanism within the constituency is relatively 
high. I don't think we need to belabor the problems in conceiving of 
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comparative law in terms of families of law. When we organize and 
classify legal systems into families of law, we necessarily attach 
ourselves to certain criteria, and those criteria drive the composition 
and the structure of the families. 
What we need to do is begin rethinking the suggestion that was 
made. We need to rethink what the relative criterion is for classifying 
those systems if we are inclined to classify. Some of us are not 
inclined to classify. But I think that the fundamental question is—
what criterion is relevant? And it’s no longer whether Roman law 
serves as one of the intellectual arches of the legal system that 
divides one family from another. Thank you very much. 
DAVID SNYDER: Thank you. When I put this panel together as I 
told you in the introduction, my hope was that it would make me feel 
better. Now let me just say that when I put together a list of the 
problems—and Professor Glenn, yes, I did write that little polemic in 
the program, as you guessed—I didn’t want to set all the categories 
because I realized I might not be seeing everything myself. In doing 
that, it had not occurred to me that you were going to give me all 
kinds of other things to worry about, in addition to the ones that had 
already occurred to me. 
Nevertheless, after having heard all of the problems or challenges, 
I think one thing we heard from the panel is about the promise of 
comparative law. So much of it resonated for me, but I need to be 
quick. So let me just say that something that makes me happy is to 
think explicitly about comparative law as a humanistic discipline—a 
particularly humanistic discipline, within the larger discipline of law, 
which is itself humanistic, as well as many other things. 
Regardless of the promise of comparative law, the panel has 
convinced me of the necessity of comparative law. It is unavoidable. 
And I think Professor Glenn teaches us that we ought to accept what 
is unavoidable with a smile.  
 
